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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE DIFFICULTY ACCOMMODATING HEALTH CARE WORKERS

NICOLE BUONOCORE PORTER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act 1 (ADA), enacted in 1990, requires
employers to provide reasonable accommodations to employees with
disabilities. 2 Reasonable accommodations can include: making existing
facilities accessible, job restructuring, part time or modified work schedules,
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of devices, and
others. 3 The reasonable accommodation provision’s significance is notably
enhanced by the passage of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 4 which
dramatically expanded the protected class under the ADA. 5 Because many
more cases are succeeding past the inquiry of whether an individual has a
disability and reaching the merits of the case, 6 courts are being forced to
grapple with difficult accommodation issues. 7 Although employees in all
industries may need the protection of the ADA’s reasonable accommodation

* Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. I would like to thank Professor Marcia
McCormick, Professor Elizabeth Pendo, and the Journal of Health Law & Policy for inviting me
to participate in this great symposium.
1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012).
2. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
3. Id. § 12111(9).
4. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213).
5. See generally Nicole Buonocore Porter, The New ADA Backlash, 82 TENN. L. REV. 1
(2014) [hereinafter Porter, Backlash]; Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved
Americans with Disabilities Act: Assessing the Amendments Act of 2008, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 217, 218 (2008), http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1144&context=nulr_online.
6. Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical Examination of Case Outcomes Under the ADA
Amendments Act, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2027, 2029 (2013).
7. See generally Nicole Buonocore Porter, Martinizing Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 47 GA. L. REV. 527 (2013) (discussing the difficulty courts have in deciding
reasonable accommodation issues).
1
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provision, this essay, as part of a larger symposium, 8 is focused on reasonable
accommodations needed by health care workers.
Specifically, I argue that accommodating health care workers is difficult,
perhaps more difficult than accommodating other workers, and I explain why.
First, in Part II, I will describe the characteristics of health care jobs that make
those jobs difficult for individuals with disabilities. These characteristics
include: (1) most health care jobs are physically rigorous, often involving
heavy lifting, pushing, and walking and standing for long periods of time; (2)
most health care jobs involve long hours and/or shift work; and (3) the
majority of jobs in the health care industry are safety-sensitive positions, with
life or death often hanging in the balance.
In Part III, I discuss the three most common types of accommodations
needed by employees with disabilities in the health care workforce and how
employers and courts react to these accommodation requests. Finally, in Part
IV, I turn to three over-arching issues I have identified in prior work and
analyze how those issues manifest themselves (and are often magnified) in the
health care context. Specifically, I will discuss: (1) employers’ reluctance to
provide modifications to the “structural norms” 9 of the workplace; (2) “special
treatment stigma” in the workplace—the reluctance of employers to provide
accommodations that place burdens on other employees or that are seen as
preferential treatment; and (3) “withdrawn accommodations”—the situation
where employers take away accommodations previously provided.
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF HEALTH CARE JOBS
As stated above, there are three characteristics of many health care
industry jobs that make accommodation requests fairly common but also fairly
difficult to provide. This Part will discuss these three characteristics.
A.

Physically Rigorous

Many health care jobs are physically rigorous. They often require standing,
walking, and heavy lifting. Even when employees are not required to lift heavy
weight unassisted very often, many health care employers consider lifting to be
an essential function of the job 10 because when it is required, there often is not

8. Nicole Buonocore Porter, Address at the William C. Wefel Center for Employment Law
and the Center for Health Law Studies at Saint Louis University School of Law’s Symposium:
The ADA at 25: Disability Rights and the Health Care Workforce (Mar. 27, 2015).
9. The term “structural norms” is referring to hours, shifts, schedules, attendance policies,
etc. Porter, Backlash, supra note 5, at 5-6.
10. In order for a disabled employee to make out a prima facie case of disability
discrimination, she has to prove that she is a qualified individual with a disability. Keith v.
County of Oakland, 703 F.3d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 2013). In order to prove that she is qualified, a
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time to seek assistance. Several cases demonstrate the physically rigorous
nature of health care work.
For instance, in Guneratne v. St. Mary’s Hospital, the employer stated that
the physical requirements of the job included lifting or carrying weight up to
forty pounds frequently and over forty pounds occasionally. 11 The court agreed
with the employer, stating that the lifting requirements were essential because
nurses must be prepared to react to emergency situations. 12 Thus, the court
held that the plaintiff, who had a lifting restriction of not more than five
pounds because of a back injury, was not able to perform the essential
functions of the job. 13
In another case, Lenker v. Methodist Hospital, the court refused to overturn
the jury’s determination that lifting was an essential function. 14 The court
stated,
The jury heard evidence that Methodist considered lifting an essential function
of the job, that it was part of the job description for staff nurses, that at times,
staff shortages or emergencies left a nurse without assistance in a lifting task,
and that the need for lifting was not always predictable because patients
15
sometimes fell or needed assistance unexpectedly.

Similarly, deferring to the employer’s judgment that being able to lift forty
pounds was an essential function of the plaintiff’s position as a nurse, the court
in another case held that the plaintiff was not qualified because she could not
lift more than twenty-five pounds, per her doctor’s orders. 16
In addition to lifting requirements, health care jobs often involve frequent
walking and standing. For instance, in Basith v. Cook County, the plaintiff was
a pharmacy technician in a hospital, whose job included preparation of IV
solutions and the delivery and stocking of medications, which involved
walking. 17 After a leave of absence following the injury of his leg in a car
accident, he came back to work with several restrictions, including that he
could not stand for more than ten minutes, walk more than fifty yards, or lift
more than ten pounds. 18 The debate in this case was whether the delivery
function, which took about forty-five minutes to an hour and required walking

plaintiff must establish that she can perform the essential functions of the job, with or without
reasonable accommodations. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2012).
11. Guneratne v. St. Mary’s Hosp., 943 F. Supp. 771, 773 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
12. Id. at 774.
13. Id. at 772, 774.
14. Lenker v. Methodist Hosp., 210 F.3d 792, 796 (7th Cir. 2000).
15. Id.
16. Griffin v. Prince William Health Sys., No. 01:10-CV-359, 2011 WL 1597508, at *2-4
(E.D. Va., Apr. 26, 2011).
17. Basith v. Cook County, 241 F.3d 919, 924, 927-28 (7th Cir. 2001).
18. Id. at 924.
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for that entire time, was an essential function of the job for a pharmacy
technician. 19
Some jobs involve both walking and heavy lifting or pushing. For instance,
in Bryant v. Caritas Norwood Hospital, the plaintiff was a staff nurse in the
ambulatory surgery department, which required lifting and transporting
patients. 20 She had no difficulty with her job for many years until she
experienced blurred vision and was diagnosed with a central serous
retinopathy, which caused a hemorrhage in her left eye that worsened with any
type of straining, sneezing, coughing, and specifically, heavy lifting. 21 Because
of these limitations, she admitted that she could not perform one of the
essential functions of the job. 22
B.

Long Hours/Shift Work

Many health care jobs, especially those in hospitals, involve long hours
and often require employees to work night shifts or rotating shifts. These
scheduling requirements are difficult for many individuals with disabilities.
For instance, in Azzam v. Baptist Healthcare Affiliates, Inc., the plaintiff’s job
as a nurse in the surgery unit required her to be on-call one night each week
and weekends on a rotating basis. 23 The plaintiff was diagnosed with
“symptomatic a[trial]-fib[rillation]” and was put on restrictions with respect to
her hours. 24 She could only work four hours per day (rather than the normal
eight hours) and she could no longer work nights or weekends. 25
In Laurin v. Providence Hospital, the plaintiff worked as a staff nurse in a
twenty-four hour maternity ward. 26 All nurses had to work one-third of their
scheduled hours on either the evening shift or the midnight shift. 27 After she
suffered a seizure, her neurologist opined that a day shift was necessary for the
plaintiff to continue to work safely. 28 Similarly, the plaintiff in Schott v. Trinity
Health Michigan could not work the normal schedule of thirteen-hour days for
seven to eight consecutive days because she suffered from bipolar disorder. 29

19. Id. at 928-30.
20. Bryant v. Caritas Norwood Hosp., 345 F. Supp. 2d 155, 158 (D. Mass. 2004).
21. Id. at 158.
22. Id. at 167.
23. Azzam v. Baptist Healthcare Affiliates, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 2d 653, 655 (W.D. Ky. 2012).
24. Id. at 655-56.
25. Id. at 656.
26. Laurin v. Providence Hosp., 150 F.3d 52, 54 (1st Cir. 1998).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 55.
29. Schott v. Trinity Health Mich., No. 11-12468, 2013 WL 1090514, at *1-2 (E.D. Mich.,
Mar. 15, 2013).
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C. Safety-sensitive Positions
Certainly, there are other industries where employees are expected to
engage in physically rigorous work and long hours or shift work. 30 But the
health care industry is unique in the sense that many of these jobs are also
safety-sensitive. In other words, in many cases, life or death (or at least the
physical well-being of the patients) hangs in the balance. Employers and courts
often refer to the safety-sensitive nature of these positions.
For instance, in one case, the court said that the plaintiff was not qualified
as a staff nurse or a head nurse because of her inability to provide “direct
patient care.” 31 The court pointed favorably to the defendant’s evidence that
being able to provide direct patient care was an essential function of the head
nurse position: “direct patient care at a large metropolitan hospital requires a
nurse to be able to attend to the needs of patients at all times . . . and to respond
to emergencies, [which might include] assisting a patient who has collapsed.” 32
In a similar case, the court held that modifying the physical functions of the
nursing job was not possible “because nurses must be prepared to immediately
react in emergency situations.” 33 The court also stated that allowing the
plaintiff an accommodation of seeking assistance when she needed help lifting
might put patients at risk. 34
The court in Samper v. Providence St. Vincent Medical Center was very
explicit about the safety-sensitive nature of the plaintiff’s position as a nurse in
the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU). 35 In holding that attendance was an
essential function (and that the plaintiff was not entitled to unlimited absences
as a reasonable accommodation for her disability), the court stated that the atrisk population in the NICU “cries out for constant vigilance, team
coordination and continuity.” 36 Agreeing with another case in the First Circuit,
the court stated, “[m]edical needs and emergencies—many potentially lifethreatening—do not mind the clock, let alone staff-nurse convenience. . . .” 37
In some cases, the employer more explicitly relied on the “direct threat”
defense. One of the defenses to an employer’s liability under the ADA is if the
employer has “qualification standards” that are job-related and consistent with
business necessity. 38 One of these qualification standards “[might] include a

30. For instance, manufacturing jobs are often physically rigorous and require long hours
and/or shift work.
31. Davis v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 508 F. App’x 26, 28-29 (2d Cir. 2013).
32. Id. at 29.
33. Guneratne v. St. Mary’s Hosp., 943 F. Supp. 771, 774 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
34. Id. at 775.
35. Samper v. Providence St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233, 1235 (9th Cir. 2012).
36. Id. at 1235, 1238.
37. Id. at 1238 (quoting Laurin v. Providence Hosp., 150 F.3d 52 (1st Cir. 1998).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (2012).
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requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or
safety of other[s]. . . .” 39 Direct threat is defined as a “significant risk to the
health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable
accommodation.” 40
For instance, in Haas v. Wyoming Valley Health Care System, the doctor
was an orthopedic surgeon who had a hypomanic episode while performing a
total knee replacement. 41 The court had to decide whether the plaintiff’s
mental disability created a direct threat to his patients. 42 Similarly, the court in
Olsen v. Regional Medical Center held that the plaintiff was not a qualified
individual because she suffered many seizures when she was performing as a
mammography technician, creating a direct threat to herself and her patients. 43
III. COMMON ACCOMMODATIONS REQUESTED BY HEALTH CARE WORKERS
Broadly speaking, accommodations generally fall into three categories: (1)
modifications to the physical functions of the job; (2) modifications to the
structural norms of the job; and (3) reassignment to a vacant position. 44 In the
health care context, employers often refuse to grant these accommodations.
Many of these cases also include a discussion of the “essential functions” of
the job. This inquiry is related to the reasonable accommodation inquiry
because an employee cannot proceed with a disability discrimination claim
unless the employee can establish that she is “qualified,” which is defined as
being able to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without
reasonable accommodations. 45
A.

Modifications to the Physical Functions of the Job

As discussed above, many health care jobs are physically rigorous; thus,
disabilities that affect standing, lifting, walking, and pushing require
employees with these disabilities to seek accommodations to the physical
functions of the job. For instance, as discussed above, in Guneratne v. St.
Mary’s Hospital, the plaintiff was a registered nurse at a hospital when she
injured her back while lifting a patient and was put on restrictions including no
lifting more than five pounds. 46 The employer alleged that the physical

39.
40.
41.
42.
genuine
one).
43.
44.
45.
46.

42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2012) (emphasis added).
42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (2012).
Haas v. Wyo. Valley Health Care Sys., 465 F. Supp. 2d 429, 430 (M.D. Pa. 2006).
Id. at 436-37 (analyzing the direct threat issue, but ultimately holding that there was a
issue of material fact regarding whether the risk posed by the plaintiff was a significant
Olsen v. Reg’l Med. Ctr., 713 F.3d 1149, 1152-54 (8th Cir. 2013).
Id. § 12111(9).
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2012).
Guneratne v. St. Mary’s Hosp., 943 F. Supp. 771, 772 (1996).
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requirements of the job included lifting or carrying weight up to forty pounds
frequently and over forty pounds occasionally. 47 The court agreed with the
employer, and thus held that the plaintiff was not able to perform the essential
functions of the job without an accommodation. 48 The court separately
considered the question of whether the plaintiff could perform the essential
functions with an accommodation. 49 The plaintiff suggested that she should
have been allowed to avoid heavy lifting and/or been permitted to request
assistance when heavy lifting was required. 50 However, the court held that
such an accommodation would eliminate or reallocate essential functions of
the job and might put patients at risk. 51 Thus, no accommodation was
possible. 52
Similarly, in Lenker v. Methodist Hospital, the plaintiff was a nurse who
had multiple sclerosis (MS). 53 After he had an MS symptom that resulted in a
ten-day hospitalization, his doctor advised that he should not do any heavy
lifting. 54 The issue in the case turned on whether lifting was an essential
function of the plaintiff’s job and whether the employer should have
accommodated him. 55 Because the court agreed with the jury’s determination
that lifting was considered an essential function of the job, the court held that
the plaintiff could not be accommodated. 56
The plaintiff in Phelps v. Optima Health, Inc. also had a lifting
restriction. 57 She had worked as a staff nurse for four years and after she
injured her back, she quit. 58 Six years later, the employer rehired her in a
position it created that did not require heavy lifting. 59 Subsequently, the
employer was short-staffed so it allowed her to perform some patient care even
though she could not do all of the duties of a staff nurse. 60 She either shared
the patient load with her sister, who was also a nurse, or other nurses would
help her with lifting tasks. 61 Eventually, the employer refused to let her work
without the ability to lift fifty pounds. 62 Because there was no other position
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 773.
Id. at 774.
Id.
Id. at 775.
Guneratne, 943 F. Supp. at 775.
Id.
Lenker v. Methodist Hosp., 210 F.3d 792, 794 (7th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 795.
Id. at 796.
Id. at 796-97.
Phelps v. Optima Health, Inc., 251 F.3d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 2001).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Phelps, 251 F.3d at 24.
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for her, she was terminated. 63 The court stated that lifting was an essential
function and the employer was under no obligation to accommodate the
plaintiff’s inability to lift. 64
The employer in Basith v. Cook County also had a difficult time
accommodating the plaintiff’s physical restrictions. 65 As discussed above, the
plaintiff was a pharmacy technician in a hospital and his job included
preparation of intravenous (IV) solutions and the delivery and stocking of
medications. 66 After a leave of absence following the injury of his leg in a car
accident, he came back to work with several restrictions. 67 He could not stand
for more than ten minutes, walk more than fifty yards, or lift more than ten
pounds. 68 After attempting to return to work with revised restrictions, he asked
for a shift change because the current shift required him to stand and move too
much. 69 When the employer tried to accommodate him by having someone
else deliver the medications, he complained that the employer did not
accommodate him enough and he went on leave. 70 Eventually, he asked to be
assigned to only sedentary tasks. 71 The debate in this case was whether the
delivery function, which took about forty-five minutes to an hour and required
walking, was an essential function of the job for a pharmacy technician. 72 If it
were, the employer would not be required to eliminate it in order to
accommodate the plaintiff. 73 Although the court remanded for this factual
determination, it seems to me that a task that takes forty-five minutes to an
hour could very well be deemed an essential function and thus, it might be
difficult for the employer to accommodate this employee.
The court in Davis v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp. also held
that the plaintiff could not be accommodated. 74 The plaintiff was a nurse who
could not lift patients, or push a wheelchair, stretcher, or heavy cart. 75 She
acknowledged that, with her limitations, she could not provide direct patient
care as a “staff nurse,” but there was a question regarding whether she was a
“head nurse,” and if so, whether direct patient care was required for the head

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id. at 26.
See Basith v. Cook County, 241 F.3d 919 (7th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 924.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 925.
Basith, 241 F.3d at 925.
Id. at 926.
Id. at 928-29.
Id. at 929-30.
Davis v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 508 F. App’x 26, 29 (2d Cir. 2013).
Id. at 29.
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nurse position. 76 The employer argued that even head nurses are required to
perform these “direct patient care” tasks, and, therefore, the plaintiff was not
qualified. 77 She had not presented evidence that there were any possible
reasonable accommodations that would allow her to perform those tasks. 78
In Hancock v. Washington Hospital Center, the plaintiff had difficulty with
both lifting and walking. 79 The plaintiff was a medical assistant, the duties of
which included triaging patients, among other responsibilities. 80 Both parties
agreed that triaging patients was considered an essential function of her job. 81
The plaintiff discovered she had fibroid cysts in her rectum. 82 She had surgery
to remove them but suffered complications. 83 Additional surgery resulted in
her spine being punctured, which caused nerve damage. 84 This nerve damage
limited her ability to walk and lift and left her with a permanent limp that
precluded her from walking long distances. 85 When she returned to work, she
was placed on light duty and was prohibited from lifting and bending, and she
was not supposed to triage patients. 86 Eventually, the employer refused to
accommodate her light duty request and she was terminated. 87 The court held
that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether her
restrictions were permanent or temporary, and, thus, whether she was seeking
permanent or temporary light duty. 88 The court stated that the employer had
granted light duty for a period of time and could not just withdraw it without
establishing that continuing with the light duty assignment would create an
undue hardship. 89 Thus, the court refused to grant the employer’s motion for
summary judgment. 90 Despite this positive result for the plaintiff, the court did
infer that if her need for light duty were permanent, the employer would not
have to accommodate her. 91
For some positions, it is possible to accommodate a lifting restriction or
difficulty pushing heavy wheelchairs. For instance, in Kauffman v. Petersen
Health Care VII, LLC, the plaintiff worked in a nursing home, but the only
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Hancock v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 908 F. Supp. 2d 18, 21 (D.D.C. 2012).
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 20-21.
Hancock, 908 F. Supp. 2d at 21.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 24.
Hancock, 908 F. Supp. 2d at 25.
Id.
Id. at 24.
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heavy lifting required of her job (as a hairdresser) was to push the nursing
home residents in their wheelchairs from their rooms to the on-site salon. 92
After a hysterectomy resulted in complications and a restriction on lifting and
pushing any more than fifty pounds, 93 the nursing home refused to
accommodate her by asking other employees to deliver the residents to the
beauty salon. 94 The court, through Judge Posner, estimated that the time spent
wheeling residents was a very small proportion of her overall work day, and
considering total staff hours, it would likely not be a hardship to ask other staff
members to wheel the residents back and forth to the beauty salon. 95 Because it
was a question of fact regarding whether wheeling the residents was an
essential function of the plaintiff’s job, the court reversed the trial court’s grant
of summary judgment to the employer. 96 The court stated that “[i]f a minor
adjustment in the work duties of a couple of other employees would have
enabled the plaintiff despite her disability to perform the essential duties of her
job as a hairdresser, the nursing home’s refusal to consider making such an
adjustment was unlawful.” 97 Of course, this case is distinguishable from the
other health care cases because, even though it takes place in a nursing home,
the plaintiff’s actual position was not health care related. She was a
hairdresser. For many of the other nursing home employees, the ability to lift
patients and push wheelchairs would not be an occasional duty but would be
frequently required.
B.

Structural Norms of the Workplace

As stated above, the structural norms of the workplace are not the actual
physical functions of the job, but instead involve the when and where work is
performed—hours, schedules, shifts, attendance policies, leaves of absence,
etc. Because many health care jobs are in hospitals or other settings that
operate 24/7, accommodating schedule changes can be difficult.
For instance, in a case discussed above, Azzam v. Baptist Healthcare
Affiliates, Inc., the plaintiff’s job as a nurse in the surgery unit required her to
be on call one night each week and weekends on a rotating basis. 98 The
plaintiff was diagnosed with “symptomatic a[trial]-fib[rillation]” and was put
on restrictions with respect to her hours. 99 She could only work four hours per
92. Kauffman v. Petersen Health Care VII, LLC, 769 F.3d 958, 959 (7th Cir. 2014).
93. Id. at 960.
94. Id. at 961. In fact, when she asked for an accommodation, her boss told her “we just
don’t allow people to work with restrictions . . . .” Id.
95. Id. at 961-62.
96. Kauffman, 769 F.3d at 962 (stating that wheeling the residents is not an essential
function if it can be assigned to other employees without much of a hardship at all).
97. Id. at 959.
98. Azzam v. Baptist Healthcare Affiliates, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 2d 653, 655 (W.D. Ky. 2012).
99. Id.
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day (rather than the normal eight hours) and she could no longer work nights
or weekends. 100 The employer complied with her restrictions for several
months, assigning other nurses to take on her on-call responsibilities. 101
Eventually, the employer tired of this and asked her to return to being oncall. 102 She refused and they terminated her. 103 The court held that she was not
qualified because she could not perform the eight-hour shifts and the on-call
responsibilities of the nursing position, both of which were essential functions,
according to the court. 104 Thus, the court held that it was not possible to
accommodate her. 105
As is common in many hospitals, the plaintiff in Laurin v. Providence
Hospital was a nurse who was required to work some evening and midnight
shifts. 106 After she was diagnosed with a seizure disorder, her neurologist
opined that a daytime only position was necessary for the plaintiff. 107 The
employer allowed her a temporary accommodation of working only day shifts,
but refused to accommodate her on a permanent basis. 108 The court held that
shift rotation was an essential function of the job, and, thus, there was no
accommodation possible. 109
C. Reassignment to a Vacant Position
In some cases, the plaintiff acknowledges that she would be unable to
perform the essential functions of the job because of her disability, and, thus,
requests reassignment to another position as an accommodation. The ADA’s
reasonable accommodation provision specifically includes “reassignment to a
vacant position” as a possible accommodation. 110 However, because so many
health care jobs involve physically rigorous tasks and/or long hours, it is often
difficult for the employer and the plaintiff to find and agree on a suitable
position to which the plaintiff can be reassigned. Often, the employer offers
reassignment to a position that results in a demotion or less pay for the
plaintiff.
For instance, in Hedrick v. Western Reserve Care System, the plaintiff
worked as a registered nurse for twenty-two years before she developed

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 656.
Id.
Id.
Azzam, 855 F. Supp. 2d at 656.
Id. at 661-62.
Id. at 662.
Laurin v. Providence Hosp., 150 F.3d 52, 54 (1st Cir. 1998).
Id. at 55.
Id.
Id. at 59.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2012).
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osteoarthritis in both of her knees and broke her leg. 111 After her leave of
absence, she was unable to perform her normal nursing duties. 112 The
employer did try to find her an alternative position, but she turned down the
offered position because the salary was much lower than she had been
making. 113 Because she turned down that offer of reassignment, the court held
that she was not a qualified individual with a disability. 114
Making reassignment more difficult is the fact that employers are not
required to create a position in order to accommodate an employee who can no
longer perform the essential functions of her position. Thus, for instance, the
employer in Miller v. Bon Secours Baltimore Health Corp. was not obligated
to continue to staff a position it created for the plaintiff when she could no
longer perform her regular job duties. 115 In other words, because it was under
no obligation to originally create a position that the plaintiff could perform
with her disability-related restrictions, it was also under no obligation to
continue to employ the plaintiff in that position. 116
Of course, situations exist where it is possible to find another job for an
individual with a disability in the health care setting, but sometimes employers
are not very receptive to doing so. For instance, in Norville v. Staten Island
University Hospital, the plaintiff was a nurse at a hospital when, after a leave
of absence for her disability, she had to avoid heavy lifting, stretching, and
bending, which precluded her from performing her position. 117 Although she
applied to several vacant positions, she either turned them down because they
involved a demotion in pay or seniority or the employer said she was
unqualified for others, ultimately resulting in her termination. 118 The court held
that the employer had failed to accommodate her because it was not a
reasonable accommodation to offer her a position that would involve a
significant diminution in pay and prestige, and there was a factual issue with
regard to whether she was qualified for one of the vacant positions to which
the employer had refused to reassign her. 119 Overall, these cases demonstrate
that, although reassignment continues to be an important accommodation to

111. Hedrick v. W. Reserve Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444, 449 (6th Cir. 2004).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 450.
114. Id. at 457-58.
115. Miller v. Bon Secours Balt. Health Corp., No. 98-2046, 1999 WL 731098, at *3 (D. Md.
Sept. 20, 1999).
116. Id. (“To the extent that Miller contends that she is somehow entitled to lifetime
employment because her position was created as an accommodation for her disability, she is
incorrect.”).
117. Norville v. Staten Island U. Hosp., 196 F.3d 89, 93-94 (2d Cir. 1999).
118. Id. at 94.
119. Id. at 99-100.
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consider, it often is not available to employees with disabilities working in the
health care setting.
IV. EXACERBATING THE PROBLEM
In other work, I have identified three themes that play out over and over
again in reasonable accommodation cases. These three themes are likely to
exacerbate the difficulty accommodating health care workers. The first is
employers’ reluctance to modify the structural norms of the workplace—hours,
shifts, schedules, etc. The second is the concern employers have offering
accommodations that are seen as “special treatment” and are therefore resented
by coworkers. I call this “special treatment stigma.” Finally, the third theme is
what I refer to as “withdrawn accommodations,” where employers provide an
accommodation temporarily but ultimately discontinue providing the
accommodation. I address each of these three themes in turn, and discuss how
they play out in the health care context.
A.

Reluctance to Modify Structural Norms

As I identified in prior work, employers are more reluctant to provide
accommodations that modify the structural norms of the workplace than they
are to provide accommodations that seek to modify the physical functions of
the job. 120 Even when an accommodation would seemingly not cause any
hardship at all on an employer, the employer is often still unwilling to provide
it. For instance, employers have been unwilling to allow employees a variation
from a rotating shift, or to allow employees to work less than full-time. 121 This
is especially significant in the health care context because so many health care
employers are open 24/7 and these jobs often involve long hours and/or shift
work. 122
In my prior work, I attempted to offer some insights into why employers
seem to be less willing to allow modifications to the structural norms of the
workplace than they are to the physical functions of the job. 123 One
explanation is that accommodations given regarding hours, shifts, and
schedules worked often have tangible effects on other employees. 124 This is
because employees might be expected to pick up the slack if a disabled
employee cannot work a particular shift or must work fewer hours. Employers

120. Porter, Backlash, supra note 5, at 70-82.
121. See, e.g., id. at 74-76 (discussing post-ADAAA cases where courts held that employers
were not required to allow an employee an accommodation related to the employee’s shift or
hours required); Nicole Buonocore Porter, Special Treatment Stigma after the ADA Amendments
Act, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 213 (2016) (hereinafter Porter, Stigma) (collecting cases).
122. See supra Part II.B & III.B (discussing some of these cases in the health care context).
123. Porter, Backlash, supra note 5, at 79-82.
124. Id. at 79.
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are reluctant to give accommodations that place burdens on other
employees. 125 Doing so causes resentment by those employees, which is what I
refer to as “special treatment stigma,” discussed next.
B.

Special Treatment Stigma

Special treatment stigma is a term I coined to describe the stigma that
occurs when individuals are given special treatment in the workplace. 126 For
individuals with disabilities, this special treatment is in the form of reasonable
accommodations. 127 Special treatment stigma manifests itself in two distinct
but related ways. First, coworkers resent when individuals with disabilities are
given accommodations that either place burdens on the coworkers or are
accommodations that those coworkers would also desire. 128 And second,
because employers are reluctant to place burdens on the coworkers or to
otherwise create discord between employees, they are less likely to grant
accommodation requests when the accommodations are perceived as
preferential treatment or placing burdens on other employees. 129
There are several cases in the health care context that demonstrate this
special treatment stigma. For instance, the Azzam v. Baptist Healthcare
Affiliates, Inc. case involved the situation where an accommodation arguably
placed burdens on other employees. 130 In Azzam, a nurse was on light duty and
could only work limited hours and could not be on-call for nights or
weekends. 131 The employer accommodated her restrictions for a period of time
but the other nurses began complaining about having to assume the plaintiff’s
on-call responsibilities. 132 Thus, the employer fired her. 133
Similarly, in Laurin v. Providence Hospital, the plaintiff worked as a nurse
in a maternity unit where rotating shifts were required. 134 After her doctor
advised that she keep a regular schedule, her supervisors polled the nurses in
the maternity unit and the majority of those nurses objected to a days-only
position for the plaintiff and refused to cover her evening and night shifts. 135
In Kauffman v. Petersen Health Care VII, LLC, the employer was not
willing to place even a very minor burden on other employees in order to

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 80; see also Porter, Stigma, supra note 121.
Porter, Stigma, supra note 121.
Id.
Id. at 236-37.
Id. at 235-36.
Azzam v. Baptist Healthcare Affiliates, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 2d 653, 656 (W.D. Ky. 2012).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Laurin v. Providence Hosp., 150 F.3d 52, 54 (1st Cir. 1998).
Id. at 55.
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accommodate the plaintiff’s disability-related restrictions. 136 The plaintiff was
a hairdresser in a nursing home, but her only work-related restriction was that
she could not transport the nursing home’s patients via wheelchair from their
room to the salon on-site. 137 The employer refused to require other employees
to wheel the patients for the plaintiff, and, thus, the plaintiff was forced to
quit. 138
In the Hancock v. Washington Hospital Center case, the issue was not
about accommodations that placed burdens on other employees, but an
accommodation that other employees might also covet. 139 In Hancock, the
plaintiff was a medical assistant, whose restrictions after a medical leave of
absence precluded her from doing her regular job. 140 The employer gave her
light duty for a period of time, but then ultimately refused to accommodate her
restrictions. 141 During a conversation between her supervisors about the
plaintiff’s restrictions, one supervisor asked another, “Don’t we always need
staff on the telephone?” 142 The other supervisor responded, “If I only utilize
her on the phones (long term), then it sets me up to have to make likewise
accommodations for other staff members in the future.” 143 Thus, special
treatment stigma affects employers’ willingness to accommodate individuals
with disabilities.
C. Withdrawn Accommodations
In a recent paper, I identified a third common theme in reasonable
accommodation cases—withdrawn accommodations. 144 “This scenario occurs
when an employer has provided an accommodation to an individual with a
disability for some period of time but ultimately withdraws the
accommodation, often claiming that the employer did not realize that the need
for the accommodation was permanent rather than temporary.” 145 The other
way in which this scenario arises is when a new supervisor comes onto the
scene, and decides that an accommodation that has been given should not have
been given in the first place, and, thus, takes it away. 146 The legal issue that
arises in these cases is determining the relevance of the prior accommodation

136.
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139.
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143.
144.
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146.

Kauffman v. Petersen Health Care VII, LLC, 769 F.3d 958, 961 (7th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 960.
Id. at 961.
Hancock v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 908 F. Supp. 2d 18, 25 (D.D.C. 2012).
Id. at 21.
Id.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Nicole B. Porter, Withdrawn Accommodations, 63 DRAKE L. REV. 885, 890, 896 (2015).
Id. at 890.
Id. at 896.
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when deciding whether that particular accommodation is reasonable. There are
many health care accommodation cases that involved this issue.
For instance, in Basith v. Cook County, the employer temporarily
reassigned one of the plaintiff’s job duties as a pharmacy technician—
delivering medications. 147 After several leaves of absence and several attempts
to return to work, the court held that the delivery of medications was an
essential function of the job. 148 The court specifically addressed the issue of
the withdrawn accommodation. 149 It stated that just because the employer
found the plaintiff another job for a period of time does not mean that the
delivery of the medication was not an essential function of the job. 150
As discussed above, the plaintiff in Phelps v. Optima Health, Inc. worked
as a staff nurse for four years until she injured her back, could no longer lift
heavy weights, and she quit. 151 Six years later, the employer rehired her in a
position it created that did not require heavy lifting. 152 Subsequently, the
employer was short-staffed so it allowed her to do some patient care even
though she could not do all of the duties of a staff nurse. 153 She either shared
the patient load with her sister, who was also a nurse, or other nurses would
help her with lifting tasks. 154 Eventually, the employer refused to let her work
without the ability to lift fifty pounds. 155 Because there was no other position
for her, she was terminated. 156 When the court considered whether lifting was
an essential function of the job, it stated that even though the employer had
made a special arrangement to account for her disability, the “court must
evaluate the essential functions of the job without considering the effect of the
special arrangements.” 157 In other words, the court stated that evidence that
accommodations were made to avoid a task simply shows that the job “could
be restructured, not that the job function was non-essential.” 158 Thus, the court
held that the employer was under no obligation to allow the plaintiff to job
share. 159
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Basith v. Cook County, 241 F.3d 919, 924-25 (7th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 929.
See id. at 930.
Id.
Phelps v. Optima Health, Inc., 251 F.3d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 2001).
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Phelps, 251 F.3d at 24.
Id. at 25.
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The court very explicitly discussed this withdrawn accommodation issue in
Laurin v. Providence Hospital. 160 In this case, as discussed above, the plaintiff
asked to only be scheduled for the day shift. 161 The employer accommodated
her temporarily, but eventually refused to continue to accommodate her
scheduling requirement. 162 In discussing whether the change in schedule was a
reasonable accommodation, the court stated that just because the employer had
allowed her to work part-time hours did not mean that the employer was
obligated to continue to do so. 163 The court stated that an “employer does not
concede that a job function is ‘non-essential’ simply by voluntarily assuming
the limited burden associated with a temporary accommodation, nor thereby
acknowledge that the burden associated with a permanent accommodation
would not be unduly onerous.” 164
Similarly, the plaintiff in Miller v. Bon Secours Baltimore Health Corp.
argued that the employer failed to accommodate her when it withdrew the
accommodation it had previously provided to her—an office clerk position that
she could perform with her disability-related restrictions. 165 The court held that
taking away the temporarily-provided position was not discriminatory, stating,
“To the extent that Miller contends that she is somehow entitled to lifetime
employment because her position was created as an accommodation for her
disability, she is incorrect.” 166
Not all of these cases are decided against the employee. For instance, in
Hancock v. Washington Hospital Center, the plaintiff was given light duty
when she returned to work from her disability-related leave of absence. 167
Ultimately, the employer withdrew the accommodation and terminated her. 168
The court held that because the employer had given her light duty for a period
of time, it could not just withdraw it, stating that there was a genuine issue of
material fact regarding the reasonable accommodation issue. 169 Interestingly,
however, the court could not determine (at the summary judgment stage)
whether she was seeking a temporary or permanent accommodation. 170 Thus, it
is possible that if her restrictions became permanent (as they often do in these

160. See generally Laurin v. Providence Hosp., 150 F.3d 52, 54 (1st Cir. 1998).
161. Id. at 55.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 60.
164. Id. at 60-61.
165. Miller v. Bon Secours Balt. Health Corp., No. 98-2046, 1999 WL 731098, at *2 (D. Md.
Sept. 20, 1999).
166. Id. at *3.
167. Hancock v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 908 F. Supp. 2d 18, 21 (D.D.C. 2012).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 24-25.
170. Id. at 23.
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cases), the court would not have held that the employer was required to
accommodate her.
V. CONCLUSION: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
In this essay, I have identified several challenges to accommodating health
care workers with disabilities. To be clear, I am not trying to place blame. In
fact, if I were, the blame would be spread fairly equally between the nature of
the health care industry, the inability of health care employers to consider
unique ways of restructuring health care jobs, and the shortcomings in the law.
As discussed above, 171 the health care industry is often defined by
physically rigorous jobs, long hours and shift work, and safety-sensitive
positions. The very nature of these jobs and the intersection of all three
characteristics make these jobs more difficult to accommodate than others—
although not impossible. Health care employers could do more to think about
unique ways of restructuring jobs. For instance, are there technological
advances that would make lifting patients easier; thus eliminating the need for
all nurses and other hospital employees to be able to lift heavy weight? Are
there other ways of scheduling hospital staff so that nurses do not have to work
twelve-hour days or rotating shifts? Finally, as I and others have argued, courts
should stop viewing structural norms of the workplace (the when and where
work is performed) as “essential functions” of the job. 172 Instead, courts should
follow the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
guidance, which states that if an employee can prove that he can perform the
actual job tasks that are essential with or without a reasonable accommodation,
the employer should have to prove that modifying its rules regarding hours,
shifts, etc. would cause an undue hardship. 173
Finally, my hope is that the 2008 amendments to the ADA, which
dramatically expanded the definition of disability, will allow disability to
become more commonplace; thus, accommodating individuals with disabilities
will become “the new normal” for all employees, including those working in
the health care industry. 174

171. See generally supra Part II.
172. See, e.g., Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of Employment
Discrimination Law, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 58-60 (2005); Porter, Backlash, supra note 5, at
78-79 (stating that courts’ deference to employers’ structural norms is counter-intuitive and
contrary to the plain language of the statute).
173. Travis, supra note 172, at 62-64. See generally U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n,
EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP
UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (October 17, 2002), www.eeoc.gov/policy/
docs/accommodation.html.
174. Porter, Stigma, supra note 121.

